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REFLECTIONS ON FUTURE WAR
Mackubin Thomas Owens
Part of preparing for war is to understand it. What is the nature of war? Whatis the character of war? Will war in the future be like war in the past? These
are critical questions that today’s military professional must attempt to answer.
Unfortunately, our track record is not very good. To envision the future is to
“look through a glass darkly.” A case in point is the debate that took place a de-
cade ago in the wake of the Cold War’s end and Operation DESERT STORM, the
first Gulf War, of 1991.
BACK TO THE FUTURE: THINKING ABOUT WAR DURING
THE 1990S
During the 1990s, some argued that the age of war had finally come to an end.1
These “international optimists” claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the subsequent globalization and increasing interdependence of the inter-
national system had converged with the recognition of the destructiveness of
modern war to render the idea of large-scale, interstate conflict more or less un-
thinkable. They contended that while small-scale strife remained a possibility, it
could be curbed by means of preventive diplomacy and cooperative structures
based on liberal principles. This view prevailed during much of the Clinton
administration.
Others argued that the future would not be that
different from the past, that indeed the causes of war
remained the same as during the time of Thucydides
—“fear, honor, and interest”—and that therefore
“bad times [would] return.”2 For example, Colin Gray
predicted then, and continues to argue today, that the
future security environment will feature the
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reemergence of great-power politics, regional nuclear wars, and traditional ter-
ritorial conflict.3
Still others contended that while conflict was still possible, it would differ
from war in the past. This view took two forms. On the one hand were the tech-
nological optimists, who believed that the United States could maintain its domi-
nant position in the international order by exploiting the “revolution in military
affairs” (RMA). On the other were the technological pessimists, who rejected the
idea of a technological El Dorado, a “golden city of guaranteed strategic riches.”4
The rapid coalition victory over Saddam Hussein that drove Iraqi forces out
of Kuwait led some influential defense experts to argue that emerging technolo-
gies and the RMA had the potential to transform the very nature of war. One of
the most prominent advocates of this position was Admiral William Owens, vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996, who contended that
these emerging technologies and “information dominance” would eliminate
“friction” and the “fog of war,” providing the commander and his subordinates
nearly perfect “situational awareness,” thereby promising “the capacity to use
military force without the same risks as before.”5 Owens argued that “technology
could enable U.S. military forces in the future to lift the ‘fog of war.’ . . .
[B]attlefield dominant awareness—the ability to see and understand everything
on the battlefield—might be possible.”6 Furthermore, “if you see the battlefield,
you will win the war.”7
A publication of the National Defense University fleshed out this claim. “In
short,” it said, “we will move from a situation in which decision making takes
place under uncertainty, or in the presence of incomplete and erroneous infor-
mation, to a situation in which decisions are made with nearly ‘perfect’ informa-
tion.”8 The chief of staff of the Air Force at the time echoed this view, saying, “In
the first part of the 21st century, you will be able to find, fix or track, and tar-
get—in near real-time—anything of consequence that moves or is located on
the face of the Earth. Quite frankly, I can tell you we can do most of that today.
We just can’t do it in real-time.”9
Those who made this argument were essentially arguing that the classic
Clausewitzian trinity of primordial violence, chance and probability, and the
subordination of war to policy had been superseded by a new technological trin-
ity: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies; advanced
command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems; and preci-
sion strike munitions. During the 1990s, the technological optimists prevailed.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid U.S. victory in the first Gulf War
gave rise to an era of strategic optimism. Analysts concluded that because of its
edge in emerging technologies, especially information technologies, the posi-
tion of the United States in the world was unassailable for the foreseeable future.
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At the same time, there was no “peer competitor” on the horizon capable of re-
placing the Soviet Union as an existential threat.
This apparent national security situation led U.S. planners in many cases to
adopt simplified—if not simplistic—defense-planning assumptions:
• Challenges to U.S. security would arise primarily from regional powers and
involve regional/theater contingencies featuring conventional major com-
bat operations (MCOs).
• These likely adversaries would be smaller, less capable versions of the
USSR.
• The American monopoly in strike, information technology, and stealth
would constitute a barrier to entry for adversaries and would continue into
the foreseeable future.
These assumptions led to major changes in U.S. force structure, including the
“conventionalization” of the U.S. strategic bomber force and a shift in the focus
of space and C3I* programs from the strategic level to the operational/techno-
logical level. Planners assumed that since future wars would be short, “strategic
speed” had become critical. Thus joint planners stressed such concepts as “rapid
halt,” “rapid decisive operations,” and “shock and awe.” One consequence of this
perspective was a lack of focus on “phase V” operations: security, stabilization,
transformation, and reconstruction.
The technological pessimists, on the contrary, rejecting the prevailing opti-
mism, claimed that America’s technological edge would be of little use in dealing
with the most likely future security environment, one in which conflict charac-
terized by brutal, nasty, and merciless ethnic and religious warfare, large-scale
banditry and the reemergence of the “warlord,” and transnational crime and ter-
rorism would be the order of the day. They argued that the United States was ill
prepared for the most likely conflicts of the future. While preparing for the wars
it wished to fight—large-scale interstate wars for which it possessed unmatched
capabilities—it ignored the conflicts that it would have to fight, those forced on
it by the asymmetric strategies of future adversaries.10 Other rejected the claim
that information “dominance” is sufficient in and of itself to provide the win-
ning edge in future wars.11
In early 1996, Colonel (now Major General) Charles Dunlap, USAF, wrote a
remarkably prescient critique of the technology-as-panacea vision of future
war that then dominated the Pentagon.12 In his article, entitled “How We Lost
the High-Tech War of 2007: A Warning from the Future,” Dunlap imagines a
future speech by an enemy leader explaining how his movement had used
O W E N S 6 3
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“asymmetric” means to negate American technological superiority—indeed,
had used information technology itself against the United States: “Praise the
One Above, the microchip ended the educational and training advantage the
American military had enjoyed.”13
This enemy had also employed “information warfare” to defeat the United
States. “We were confident we could influence the American public and its
poll-sensitive decision-makers. . . . Thus it became part of our strategy to capital-
ize on television’s power to influence decision-makers by aiming to wage war in
the most brutal—and public—way.” In Dunlap’s telling, this enemy even pur-
posely detonates a nuclear device on its own holy city and then blames it on the
United States. In retaliation for this purported American atrocity—which, of
course, turns the international community against the United States—the en-
emy deliberately and viciously mutilates female POWs, subsequently returning
them to the United States as part of an information campaign. “In no way did we
try to hide what we did; to the contrary, we advertised it—using video clips on
the Internet—as a warning of things to come.”
In this fascinating excursion into the future, Dunlap imagines a number of
techniques that have become reality, now being employed by our enemies
against us in Iraq and elsewhere. “America too often assumed that the [RMA]
would favor technologically advanced nations like herself. She failed to consider
how enemies with values and philosophies utterly at odds with hers might con-
duct war in the information age. Despite what many technology-infatuated
strategists thought in 1995, cyberscience cannot eliminate the vicious cruelty in-
herent in human conflict.”
THINKING ABOUT FUTURE WAR
While the American experience in Iraq and other episodes of the “Long War”
have failed to validate the more extreme claims of the technological optimists
who largely dominated the debate in the 1990s, those claims continue to exert
substantial influence on the debate.14 Indeed, it seems clear that the vision of the
technological optimists essentially underpinned the efforts of President George
W. Bush’s first secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to “transform” the U.S.
military from a Cold War force to one that would be more responsive to the de-
mands of the post–Cold War security environment. But is this the correct vision
of future war, and should it constitute the primary guide for U.S. strategists and
force planners?
In attempting to answer this question, it is important to recognize that, as the
discussion above illustrates, planners do not have a stellar record when it comes
to predicting the future.15 Indeed, as Loren Thompson of Washington’s
Lexington Institute has observed, the United States has suffered a major strate-
gic surprise on the average of once a decade since 1940.
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/5
In 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld issued The National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America, which breaks the challenges that the United States may
face in the future into four categories: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and dis-
ruptive.16 The first is almost always associated with states employing armies, na-
vies, and air forces in long-established forms of military competition. The
second category describes the use of insurgency and other such approaches to
erode American influence, patience, and political will. The insurgent threat in
Iraq and Afghanistan is, of course, an example of irregular warfare.
The third category describes the troublesome nexus of transnational terror-
ism, proliferation, and problem states seeking weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The fourth category is concerned with possible revolutionary technolo-
gies and technological breakthroughs—such as biotechnology; cyber operations;
space operations, including space-based weapons; or directed-energy weap-
ons—that can exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and counter current advantages.17
Critics of Defense Department investment categories argue that the Penta-
gon spends too much on systems for the arena in which the United States already
is dominant—traditional threats—and not enough on the others, especially the
irregular category. Critics observe that even as the war in Iraq was shifting to an
insurgency, the Department of Defense issued its Transformation Planning
Guidance (2003), a document that purported to provide a template for trans-
forming the Cold War military into
information age military forces [that] will be less platform-centric and more
network-centric. They will be able to distribute forces more widely by increasing in-
formation sharing via a secure network that provides actionable information at all
levels of command. This, in turn, will create conditions for increased speed of com-
mand and opportunities for self-coordination across the battlespace.
Critics claim that this proves that the Pentagon does in fact seek a technological
El Dorado.
A counterargument to the prevailing techno-centric view has been advanced
by those who espouse “fourth-generation warfare” (4GW).18 For instance, in
The Sling and the Stone, T. X. Hammes argues that the Pentagon’s emphasis on
high-tech warfare has prevented the U.S. military from adapting to a style of
warfare in which guerrillas and terrorists employ low-technology tactics to
counter American strengths and exploit American vulnerabilities.19
According to its advocates, the goal of fourth-generation warfare is to con-
vince the enemy that its strategic objectives are unachievable at acceptable cost.
The methodology of 4GW is to use all available networks—political, economic,
social, and military—to attack directly the will of the enemy. Hammes contends
that 4GW has been the most successful form of warfare of the last half-century,
O W E N S 6 5
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defeating the United States three times (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia), the
Soviet Union/Russia twice (Afghanistan and Chechnya), and France twice
(Indochina and Algeria). Indeed, only 4GW, he argues, has succeeded against su-
perpowers. Despite this, discussion of what Hammes calls 4GW has been largely
absent from the debate within the Defense Department.
WHAT’S NEW?
As skeptics predicted and events such as 9/11 and Iraq have demonstrated, ad-
versaries have adapted to American power by adopting asymmetric responses to
U.S. advantages.20 The result has been the emergence of trends that undermine
the older planning assumptions and require a rethinking of the character of fu-
ture war.
Driving Forces and Areas of Future Military Competition
Several years ago, Peter Schwartz outlined a methodology for thinking about the
future.21 He suggested that planners can best understand the emerging security
environment by positing scenarios based on an assessment of driving forces, pre-
determined elements, and critical uncertainties. The first category—assessing fu-
ture trends—is really the key to the methodology.
What are the dominant emerging trends in the security environment? They
include—but are not limited to—the proliferation of militarily useful technol-
ogy; unlimited access to information technologies, including lightweight movie
cameras, cell phones, portable laptop computers, and satellite modems that en-
sure that everyone (including adversaries) has the capability to deliver images of
conflict in real time; and aspects of globalization that permit terrorists and other
armed groups to employ cheap means to achieve costly effects by exploiting the
vulnerabilities of advanced, especially liberal, societies.
Indeed, the changing cost equation may be the most consequential trend of
all. During the Cold War, the United States possessed a decided cost advantage in
its competition with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration took advan-
tage of this by adopting an asymmetric and cost-incurring strategy to exploit the
mismatch between the large and growing American economy and the much
smaller Soviet economy. This cost-incurring strategy forced the USSR to expend
resources the Soviet economy could not afford. The combination of the U.S. de-
fense buildup, support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and such programs
as the Strategic Defense Initiative, which threatened to render obsolescent or even
obsolete the Soviet nuclear arsenal, was more than Moscow could withstand.22
As Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged in 2003, this advantage has dissipated.
“The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’
cost of millions.”23 In fact, Rumsfeld understated the cost ratio. John Robb
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contends that on 9/11 “a $250,000 attack was converted into an event that cost
the United States over $80 billion (some estimates are as high as $500 billion).”24
Another important aspect of thinking about the future is making educated
guesses about the types of military competition that may take place in the fu-
ture. Examples include power projection versus antiaccess strategies, “hider”
versus “finder,” and precision strike versus active defense.25 We can also expect
greater competition in space and cyberspace. Indeed, adversaries will seek the
capability to launch difficult-to-detect electronic or information attacks from
great distances.
Another emerging military competition involves countering the threat of at-
tack on the homeland from either a large peer competitor or from terrorists who
are able to wield much greater destructive power than in the past. To deal with
the former, the United States must be prepared to counter “traditional”
threats—for example, ballistic- and cruise-missile attack, which may occur with
substantially less warning than was anticipated only a few years ago. Addressing
the latter requires the capability to counter terrorists or other armed groups who
may well gain access to chemical and biological weapons.
Changing Character (Not Nature) of War
As noted above, it was not unusual during the 1990s for planners to claim that
emerging technologies had changed “the very nature of war.” But it seems clear
that the nature of war—as best described by the Prussian “philosopher of war,”
Carl von Clausewitz—remains constant. Clausewitz reminds us that war is a vi-
olent clash between opposing wills, each seeking to prevail over the other. In war,
the will of one combatant is directed at an animate object that reacts, often in un-
anticipated ways. This cyclical interaction between opposing wills occurs in a
realm of chance and chaos. He also identified as the enduring characteristics of
war the persistence of “general friction” as a structural component of combat,
the seeming impossibility of eliminating uncertainty, and the critical impor-
tance of “moral factors.”26
On the other hand, the “character” of war is infinite. Thus a weaker adversary
can adopt various modalities of war to engage and defeat a stronger power. Suc-
cess in war has traditionally gone to the more adaptive side, the one that can bear
the costs of the conflict relative to what Clausewitz called “the value of the ob-
ject.” Accordingly, the record shows, the materially weaker side has prevailed in a
conflict in a surprisingly large number of instances—around 40 percent of the
time since World War II.27
As Philip Bobbitt has observed, for five centuries it has taken the resources of
a state to destroy another state. Only states could muster the huge revenues, con-
script the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to threaten the survival
O W E N S 6 7
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of other states. Indeed, meeting such threats created the modern state. In the
past, every state knew that its enemy would be drawn from a small class of
nearby potential adversaries with local interests. But because of globalization,
global reach, advances in international telecommunications, rapid computa-
tion, and methods of mass destruction, this is no longer true.28
The Emerging Security Environment
The present and still evolving security environment exhibits a number of char-
acteristics that affect the character of war and will most likely continue to do so
in the future. These include such phenomena as expanded global interdepen-
dence, which although seen as a boon to globalization, also permits terrorists
and other violent ideologues to inflict damage at very low cost and risk to them-
selves. In the words of Shamil Basayev, a Chechen commander and mastermind
of the Beslan massacre, “We are not bound by any circumstances, or to anybody,
and will continue to fight as convenient and advantageous to us and by our
rules.”29
Citing this passage, John Robb observes that “this new method of warfare . . .
offers guerrillas the means to bring a modern nation’s economy to its knees and
thereby undermine the legitimacy of the state sworn to protect it. Furthermore,
it can derail the key drivers of economic globalization: the flow of resources, in-
vestment, people, and security.” Those who adopt this form of warfare, says
Robb, are not really terrorists but global guerrillas, who represent “a broad-based
threat that far exceeds that offered by terrorists or the guerrillas of the past.”30
Such global guerrillas are able to exploit the dissonance caused by “spikey” eco-
nomic development and urbanization, the diffusion of and impact of technol-
ogy (especially information technology), and the dislocation caused by
globalization and demographic bulges. They are able to effect “systems disrup-
tion” in advanced economies, by causing “cascading” failures in the system: “If
attackers can disrupt the operations of the hubs of a scale-free infrastructure
network, the entire network can collapse in a cascade of failure.”31
Because of interdependence, furthermore, failures within a single network
can cause the failure of others. In a tightly interconnected infrastructure, not
only do the transportation network, the water network, and the fuel network de-
pend on the electricity network, but the electricity network depends on the fuel
and transportation. “Global guerrillas have proven to be increasingly adept at
using these interconnections to cause cross-networks of failure.”32
Categories of War: Multidimensional Conflict
The categorization of war—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disrup-
tive—by the 2004 Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review repre-
sents an advance in thinking about future war, but it implied that adversaries
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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would focus on only one category. War, however, properly understood, is always
multidimensional. In a past dominated by state-on-state warfare, the traditional
or conventional category was central, but combatants also pursued strategies to
exploit irregular capabilities, such as guerrilla warfare and insurgency, or dis-
ruptive—attempts to undermine an enemy’s public support for the war, by, say,
acts of terrorism. But a particular form of multidimensional warfare may consti-
tute the most demanding challenge to American planners in the future: “com-
plex irregular warfare” (CIW).33
One characteristic of CIW is the likelihood that future adversaries will be
“hybrids.” These hybrid threats will seek to raise the potential cost of U.S. mili-
tary action by adopting aspects of all of the warfare categories.34 An example of a
prototype hybrid is Hezbollah. During the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah ex-
hibited both statelike capabilities—long-range missiles, antiship cruise missiles,
sophisticated antiarmor systems, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and signals
intelligence—while still skillfully executing guerrilla warfare. Such a hybrid has
the potential to complicate future U.S. military planning and execution.
Hezbollah was able to stand up to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) because it was
able to adapt skillfully to the particular circumstances that it faced. For instance,
unlike U.S. forces, which must be prepared to fight in a variety of environments
and under various conditions, Hezbollah was able to tailor its forces specifically
to counter the IDF. Since Hezbollah did not have to organize for offensive opera-
tions, it was able to concentrate on defense in depth.
With decades of experience in low-intensity conflict with the IDF, Hezbollah under-
stood its enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities. The IDF’s ground forces remain
structured for swift, conventional thrusts toward Damascus or Cairo. So Hezbollah
leaders didn’t attempt to build traditional brigades or battalions equipped with ar-
mored vehicles—the classic Arab error. Instead, they concentrated on stockpiling the
most sophisticated defensive weapons they could acquire, such as the Kornet, a lethal
late-generation Russian antitank missile, as well as a range of rockets, from long-
range, Iranian-made weapons to man-portable point-and-shoot Katyushas. Thanks
to the Katyushas, an Arab military force was able to create a substantial number of Is-
raeli refugees for the first time since 1948.
Hezbollah exhibited flexibility by fielding modular units and adopting
mission-type orders. It was effective in its innovative use of weapons. Although
most Hezbollah fighters did not seek death, the organization was willing to ac-
cept casualties. Hezbollah was perfectly willing to accept a loss ratio of about five
of its fighters to one IDF soldier. Hezbollah’s intelligence performance was sur-
prisingly effective. As Ralph Peters has observed, “Israel fought as a limping
stepchild of Clausewitz. Hezbollah fought as Sun Tzu’s fanatical son.”35
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As suggested above, the sort of hybrid threats generated by CIW and illus-
trated by Hezbollah may well constitute the most probable, most demanding,
and potentially most costly type of future conflict. Implications of wars against
hybrid threats include the likelihood that they will be extremely lethal and pro-
tracted and the prospect that since they will often take place in contested urban
zones (“feral cities”), they will be manpower intensive.36 They will be widely dis-
tributed by distance, complexity, and mission. In most cases, these hybrid
threats will seek to win the war of perceptions, waging a “conflict among the
people.” To prevail against such a threat requires “cultural intelligence” and ex-
ploitation of the “human terrain.”
The operational environment in such conflicts very likely will be character-
ized by close encounters between friendly forces and an enemy that seeks to blur
the distinctions between the conventional and the unconventional, between
combatants and noncombatants, between conflict and stability operations, and
between the physical and the psychological. After all, hybrid war is a competi-
tion for influence and legitimacy, in which perceptions are paramount. As the
current conflict in Iraq illustrates, in the battle for legitimacy religious identity
may trump or negate better governance and economic benefits.
In general, hybrid foes utilizing complex irregular warfare will attempt to ex-
ploit the political effects of a conflict, seeking to undermine the legitimacy of
U.S. military actions. Thus these enemies will try to leverage “lawfare,” the use of
the rules of warfare against the United States (while ignoring these rules them-
selves), by, for example, taking refuge among the civilian population in an at-
tempt to maximize civilian casualties.37 In turn, adversaries employing CIW will
take advantage of the fact that such casualties are magnified by the proliferation
of media assets on the battlefield. Again, CIW is above all a battle of perceptions.
As Lawrence Freedman has observed, “In irregular warfare, superiority in the
physical environment is of little value unless it can be translated into an advan-
tage in the information environment. . . . Our enemies have skillfully adapted to
fighting wars in today’s media age, but for the most part we, our country, our
government, has not.”38
Preempting Preemption
The best way to counter such threats is through preemption. To do so, the
United States needs to establish favorable conditions for access, including a
flexible forward-basing posture and an effective means to counter the asym-
metric antiaccess strategies that hybrid opponents are likely to adopt. Such
strategies would be designed to undermine the cornerstone of American
global military power: the ability to project and sustain substantial military
forces at great distances from the continental United States. In general, there
7 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/5
are four points at which an adversary may attempt to derail U.S. power
projection.
First, as the United States is deciding to project power, an adversary may at-
tempt to deter it by threatening actions that would make the cost of power pro-
jection too high, perhaps attacking targets in the homeland in order to
undermine public support for an overseas intervention. Second, as the United
States is deploying its forces to ports and airfields, an adversary may attempt to
disrupt the deployment by terrorist attacks and sabotage of transportation
means and the like. Such attacks in both of these phases would force the United
States to use forces intended for power projection to defend against attacks at
home.
Third, as the United States is transporting its forces to the theater of action
and attempting to debark, an adversary will try to deny entry by military and po-
litical means—say, attacks and threats against allies in the region. Finally, as U.S.
forces establish a lodgment and begin offensive operations, an adversary will
seek to defeat them.
In the past, adversaries have focused their efforts on the last two points, denial
and defeat. But in the future, an adversary’s most cost-efficient actions may be to
deter and disrupt the projection of U.S. forces. This possibility is the result of an-
other emerging characteristic of future conflict, “360-degree warfare.” Past wars
have usually been characterized by the existence of “fronts” and secure “rear ar-
eas,” whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Of course, airpower
provided a means of attacking the enemy’s rear, and long-range airpower and
missiles threatened to extend the ability to attack the rear to the homeland.
Nonetheless, actual attacks against the strategic rears of both sides were deterred
by the likelihood of mutual destruction.
Guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, and other armed groups have long sought to
wage “war without fronts,” but the strategic emergence of true 360-degree war-
fare is a recent development. The 9/11 attack indicated that the ability of the
United States to deter attacks against its homeland is no longer assured. Iraq and
Afghanistan illustrate that our adversaries have adopted this approach at the op-
erational and tactical levels of war as well. Thus multidimensional war in the fu-
ture is likely to be characterized by distributed, weakly connected battlefields;
unavoidable urban battles and unavoidable collateral damage exploited by the
adversary’s strategic communication; and highly vulnerable rear areas. On such
battlefields, friends and enemies are commingled, and there is a constant battle
for the loyalty of the population. All of this is exacerbated by the proliferation of
militarily useful technology, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
O W E N S 7 1
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A Large Peer Competitor?
Some contend that the American intelligence community during the 1990s and
the early 2000s was so focused on the rise of China to great-power status that it
was blind to the threat that manifested itself on 11 September 2001. But has the
pendulum now swung too far to the other extreme? Are we now so fixated on
counterinsurgency and terrorism that we will not take the steps necessary to
counter the military of a “large peer competitor?”39
The leading candidate for the role of future peer competitor is China. Accord-
ing to the Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on Chinese mili-
tary power,
much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set for their coun-
try, including in the area of China’s expanding military power and how that power
might be used. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive
transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its
territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity con-
flicts against high-tech adversaries—which China refers to as “local wars under con-
ditions of informatization.” China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance, at
present, remains limited but, as noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Re-
port, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and
field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. mili-
tary advantages.”40
The report states that China’s economic growth has permitted it to accelerate
the pace and scope of its military transformation. “The expanding military ca-
pabilities of China’s armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian mili-
tary balances; improvements in China’s strategic capabilities have ramifications
far beyond the Asia Pacific region.” China has enhanced its strategic strike capa-
bilities and pursued a robust counterspace program, “punctuated by the January
2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, antisatellite weapon.” Thus its continued
pursuit of area-denial and antiaccess strategies has expanded from “the tradi-
tional land, air, and sea dimensions of the modern battlefield to include space
and cyber-space.”
The case of China illustrates that hybrid warfare is not only a phenomenon
associated with the “low end” of the spectrum of conflict. There is no reason that
a future peer competitor would restrict military competition with the United
States to the “traditional” category alone. It would logically also try to confront
the United States asymmetrically in those areas where the United States is per-
ceived to be less capable than in the traditional category. The publication in
China several years ago of Unrestricted Warfare indicates the potential of hybrid
complex irregular warfare at the “upper end” of the spectrum of conflict.41
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THE FUTURE OF FUTURE WAR
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, any future adversary, whatever his pre-
ferred mode of warfare, will at a minimum attempt to employ all the dimensions
of warfare to counter critical U.S. military capabilities asymmetrically in such
areas as conventional warfare, force projection, C4ISR (including space opera-
tions), and precision strike.
In the area of irregular warfare, opponents will attempt to impose untenable
costs on the United States by using time-tested techniques against superior
force, threatening a protracted war of attrition to undermine domestic public
support, raising the level of violence and brutality, and expanding and escalating
the conflict by targeting the U.S. homeland and those of its key allies. In the area
of power projection, opponents will attempt to raise the cost of access by in-
creasing the risk to the United States of naval and air operations, by, in turn, ex-
panding the area of a “contested zone,” seeking to destroy high-value assets—for
instance, aircraft carriers—dissuading allies and partners from providing bases
and other forms of support to U.S. forces, and degrading the ability of the
United States to deploy forces into an area of interest.42
In the area of C4ISR, adversaries will attempt to “bring down the network” by
attacking American space assets, degrading information systems, disrupting
command and control, denying surveillance and reconnaissance, and deceiving
intelligence. In the area of precision strike, the enemy will seek to reduce
stand-off range, spoof guidance systems that enable precision attack, and dis-
perse targets, including into populated areas. All of these methods have already
been employed by adversaries; they represent manifestations of the changing
cost equation that will likely make it more difficult for the United States to use
military force in the future.43
The best way to think about the future is not to try to predict it but to project a
number of plausible alternative futures against which to test strategies and force
structures. To do so, planners must develop a representative—not exhaus-
tive—set of plausible contingencies that encompass the principal challenges the
military might encounter “over the planning horizon” (more than fifteen to
twenty years out). This approach is particularly relevant to the United States,
which, given its global responsibilities, must be prepared for a variety of contin-
gencies across the entire range of military operations.44
Andrew Krepinevich has suggested a useful methodology for addressing ar-
eas of future military competition—the reintroduction of the concept of “color
plans” reminiscent of those the United States employed during the interwar pe-
riod.45 His scenarios include
• China (disruptive peer) (Plan YELLOW)
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• North Korea (nuclear rogue) (Plan RED)
• Pakistan (failed nuclear state) (Plan GREEN)
• Radical Islam (Plan PURPLE)
• Global energy network defense (Plan BLACK)
• Global commons defense (Plan ORANGE)
• Nuclear/biological homeland attack (Plan BLUE).
These illustrative scenarios seek to identify a representative array of contin-
gencies encompassing the principal military challenges U.S. planners may con-
front over the planning horizon. As such, they presumably enable strategists and
force planners to hedge against uncertainty by testing concepts of operations
and force structures against plausible alternatives—not the most familiar ones
or the contingencies believed to be the most likely—permitting planners to as-
sess realistically the potential impact of a range of possible futures on relative
military effectiveness.46
General James Mattis, USMC, the new commander of U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand, who also has responsibility for transformation, hit the nail on the head
when he remarked several years ago, “We are not likely to get the future right. We
just need to make sure we don’t get it too wrong.” One way to ensure that we do
not get the future “too wrong” is not to confuse the nature of war—which is im-
mutable—with the character of war—which is infinitely variable. In thinking
about future war, planners cannot afford to make this mistake.
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